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The Philippines is afflicted by two of the longest running insurgencies in the world. The 
communist New People’s Army (NPA) have been fighting to establish a Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist state since 1969. The Muslim separatist movements represented by the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a break away faction, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), have been fighting a rebellion since 1973. Although the 
government and the MNLF have signed a peace agreement in 1996, violence continues to 
erupt in the island of Mindanao, where the Muslim population is concentrated. The 
resources spent on these insurgencies are a heavy burden on the Philippine economy and 
the unstable peace and order conditions created by it have kept the country’s economic 
performance far below that of its regional neighbors.  
 
 But these conflicts could have been settled earlier and the Philippines could have 
devoted more time and resources to resolving the economic causes which drove the 
insurgencies in the first place.   
 
 Why these conflicts managed not only to survive but to recover is the subject of 
thesis.  How the government responded to these internal challenges, what strategy the 
rebels adapted and the intervention of 3rd parties partly explain why these insurgencies 
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 The Philippines continues to be afflicted by two very long running insurgencies.   
The communist New People’s Army (NPA) has been fighting to establish a Marxist state 
since 1969. The Muslim separatist movements represented by the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and a break away faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF), have been fighting for a separate Muslim state since 1973. Although the 
government and the MNLF have signed a peace agreement in 1996, violence continues to 
erupt in the island of Mindanao, where the Muslim population is concentrated. The 
resources spent on these insurgencies constitute a heavy burden on the Philippine 
economy. Furthermore, the unstable peace and order conditions created by it have kept 
the country’s economic performance far below that of its regional neighbors.  
 
These insurgencies could have been resolved earlier if the Philippine government 
had pursued a straightforward policy to eliminate the insurgencies either by militarily 
defeating the rebels or by eliminating its root causes.  Instead, what is emerging is an 
ambivalent government strategy of fight-and-develop – an approach that assumes the 
country can fight the rebellions while at the same time pursuing economic development.  
Under this strategy neither goal of defeating the insurgencies or achieving national 
development will be realized because of insufficient resources for both efforts and 
unfavorable peace and order conditions. Moreover, fight-and-develop appears not to be 
product of careful and profound deliberation. It is a strategy that only becomes apparent 
in hindsight. Its results are a conflict continuing for more than 30 years.   
 
 In 1985, after twelve years of fighting, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
had decisively reduced the MNLF into scattered and isolated bands which were slowly 
turning into criminals. Yet the government failed to capitalize on the situation and today 
(2003), 18 years and P150 billion later, the situation is worse than it was in 1985.1  
                                                 
1 Figures are drawn from a statement made by Paul Dominguez, former Presidential Assistant for Regional 
Development-Mindanao, citing a preliminary World Bank study. The cost of the war, according to this 
source, was P30 million a day. 
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 The communist insurgency was reduced to its lowest point in 1995 when its 
guerilla strength dropped to about 6,000 from a high of 25,000 in 1987. Today the NPA 
claims that their strength stands at almost 13,000. Both insurgencies have spawned 
splinter groups that continue to fight and wreak violence making a peace settlement with 
the Government inconclusive.   
 
 Why these conflicts manage not only to survive for more than thirty years but to 
recover from the brink of defeat is the subject of this thesis. This topic is of obvious 
importance to those concerned with conflict termination, counterinsurgency, and post-
colonial development. International peacekeeping involves third party mediators and 
even troops to police agreements. This approach assumes that the warring factions are 
willing to end their conflict, and need only to overcome the insecurities of steps to 
demobilize, disarm and reintegrate them into society. When there is massive distrust, the 
fear of commitment to peace can be overcome by certain confidence building measures, 
for example, the integration of former rebels into the government’s security forces or 
limited demilitarization.2  Unfortunately, the warring parties in the Philippines are not 
willing to abandon their fight. As such, scholarship on counterinsurgency should provide 
clues as to why some insurgencies last longer than others, but this literature does not yet 
account for the particular combination of factors in the Philippines case which has both 
an ethnic and an ideological insurgency. [note -- The Philippines is especially interesting 
because the government has had the opportunity to fully defeat the rebels militarily, and 
the government created openings for rebels to rebuild.]   
 
 Most  insurgencies end in a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement. James D. 
Fearon has classified insurgencies according to their duration and reports that ethnic and 
peripheral insurgencies, i.e., insurgencies far removed from the national capital and 
composed of a racially or culturally distinct segment of the population, tend to last 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/AllDocWeb/16A169D91BBFC1A5C1256
D41002A0344/$file/Cost+of+War_balay_5_june03.pdf 
2 Barbara Walter. Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and 
Commitment to Peace. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999) 
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longer.3 Historically, there are only two clear cut and permanent cases of governments 
defeating insurgencies – Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and Nigeria-Biafra from 1967 to 
1970. The Malayan Emergency had an ethnic character and involved the military 
participation of  British Commonwealth forces. Most of the Malayan communist were 
ethnic Chinese, distinct from the indigenous Malays. The Biafran civil war was 
peripheral and ethnic – Igbo against non-Igbo Nigerians. Neither of these insurgencies 
have re-emerged and although internal conflict is fairly common in Nigeria, it is not a 
revival of the Biafra civil war. [3] Post-colonial states like Malaysia and, by extension, 
China and even Vietnam, have been able to develop economically, or are on a path of 
steady economic growth, only after defeating their insurgencies or achieving state 
consolidation.  The counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines is therefore necessary both 
to the prospect of war termination and economic development.  
 
This thesis will explain the unusual longevity of the current Philippine 
insurgencies in the context of three variables: the Government’s responses to these 
internal challenges, the respective rebel strategies and the intervention by 3rd parties.  
 
How governments respond to an internal challenge is significant to the duration 
and outcome of insurgencies. Governments  can quickly end the insurgency by conceding 
to all rebel demands or it can attempt to crush the rebellion by applying all the military 
force it can muster.4 Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that strategic interaction, how warring 
parties in an asymmetric contest respond to the other, determines outcome.5 Stronger 
actors can lose to weaker actors if it applies the wrong strategy. The Philippine 
Government is the stronger actor in the Moro and communist insurgencies, but is 
nonetheless vulnerable to rebel exploitation of mis-steps.  
                                                 
3 James D. Fearon. Why Some Insurgencies Lost Longer Than Others.  Paper presented at the Wold Bank-
DECRG-sponsored conference, “Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transition” at the University of California-
Irvine, May 18-20, 2001.  
4 It can be argued that civil war termination can only be classified as either a government win (G), or a 
rebel win (R) since no government, if it has any  chance of crushing the insurgency, will be willing to make 
any concessions during a negotiated settlement (S). The policy of no-negotiations with terrorist groups that 
some governments adopt is an example.  
5 Ivan Arreguin-Toft. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security, 
Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001. 
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 Rebel strategy also offers a powerful explanation for conflict duration. In guerilla 
warfare strategy, the weaker actor can ‘hemorrhage’ the stronger actor by extending the 
period of conflict since the relative cost is much higher for the strong than for the weak. 
The NPA is a particularly obdurate and intractable rebellion that has steadfastly 
maintained its strategy of protracted war; it has already exceeded the duration of the 
Chinese and Vietnamese civil wars which served as its model. Yet, it is nowhere near its 
goal of revolutionary victory. 
 
 Finally, third party intervention can extend the duration of conflict by providing a 
weaker side with resources with which to continue the conflict. Such has been the case 
with the Moro rebellion, although recently this intervention has taken a more moderate 
influence.  
 
 Together these factors provide a major explanation for the duration of these 
insurgencies that have remained active for more than three decades. 
 
 
A. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 
 Chapter II traces the development what some Filipino scholars call the country’s 
revolutionary heritage and how this heritage makes violent protest a likely option. The 
Philippines, because of its unique geography and history, is more prone to internal 
conflict than other states. Until the American period, the inhabitants of the archipelago 
identified themselves by tribe and language and, because of cruelty and oppression by 
colonial authority had developed a deep-seated suspicion of any centralizing force. The 
tension between the centralizing force of nation-building and the centripetal pull of 
regional and ethnic loyalty often broke out in violence all along Philippine history. 
Colonial policy planted the seeds of the present-day Muslim-Christian strife in Mindanao 
and created a small but enormously wealthy and politically powerful elite that rules 
Philippine society up to the present time. The country’s physical geography also explains 
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why it is difficult for any central authority to achieve national unity just as it is almost 
impossible for a rebel movement to spread and realize total victory.   
  
Chapter III focuses on the development of the communist insurgency from its 
origins in the pre-World War II Sakdal peasant uprising, to the Huk rebellion of the 
1950’s, to the present CPP/NPA rebellion. The communist insurgency continues to thrive 
because of inadequate government efforts to eliminate the socio-economic causes of 
agrarian unrest. Nevertheless, the communist guerillas still face the difficulty of 
accumulating sufficient arms to defeat government security forces. It has not been able to 
do this partly because of the difficulty of smuggling arms into an archipelagic country 
and also partly due to the absence of a generous and determined foreign sponsor. This 
situation has created a rebel movement totally devoid of foreign encumbrances – a truly 
self-contained and independent movement.  It is thus impervious to 3rd party pressure.  
The communist have also adopted a protracted war strategy and this partly explains their 
longevity. Another reason for the CPP/NPA to continue their struggle is the lucrative 
revenues that rebellion endows on its practitioners. Despite several near defeats the NPA 
today is sustained not only by their strategy and income but also by government  
bungling which can be interpreted as impending signs of revolutionary victory. Some of 
these signs are a weak economy, a grid-locked government bureaucracy, widespread 
public dissatisfaction. For the purpose of this thesis the term “NPA” will be used to refer 
to the current communist-led insurgency in the Philippines.   
  
Chapter IV covers the Muslim or Moro separatist movement. It chronicles the 
Muslim-Christian conflict from its historical roots as Asian victims of the reconquista to 
the present-day struggle for a Muslim homeland. In their fight for secession, the Moros 
aimed for a quick victory followed the fait accompli of a Bangsamoro or a Muslim state 
in Mindanao. They have been strongly influenced by 3rd parties, like other Muslim 
countries, but this influence has recently had a moderating effect. The process of 
resolving the separatist movement in Mindanao has been slow and painful. The 
Government’s response to the Muslim rebellion is a mix of diplomacy, political 
concessions, economic development and military campaigns. Some of these efforts have 
 6
been more successful than others, but success appears to be near. Government ineptitude 
breathed new life into a movement that has been defeated in the mid-1980’s. Still, local 
conditions like economic marginalization, the root cause of Muslim dissatisfaction, 
remains a major influence on the situation in Mindanao where most of the violence 
related to this rebellion takes place.  
  
Finally, Chapter V compares the two insurgencies and shows how each is 
influenced by the aforementioned factors especially by the fight and develop strategy. 
Although each rebellion is exclusive from the other, they both oppose the same enemy – 
the Government. Each rebellion responds differently to government initiatives like the 
infrastructure projects in the Bondoc Peninsula and the Mal-Mar Irrigation Project. Each 
rebellion has also shed off splinter groups. The behavior of these splinter groups are 
markedly different from those of its counterpart in the other movement. Concerns with 
other security threats posed by rightist elements within its own security forces and by the 
NPA prevented the Philippine government from fully exploiting its military advantage in 
negotiations with the MNLF in 1986. The Government’s efforts to terminate the conflicts 
remain futile because its strategy of fight and develop is inherently flawed. Economic and 
political development efforts refuse to take root because of unfavorable conditions 
created by the insurgencies. The Government remains dependent on short-term, military-
based remedies. The AFP itself is increasingly restive as it is being politicized by the 
conflict it is fighting. The Government will have to first defeat the insurgencies before 




II.  A CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETY 
 
 Anthropological evidence exists that internal conflict occurred among the early 
inhabitants of the Philippines long before the era of European colonization. Samuel K. 
Tan identifies these as following two patterns – within the tribe and between tribes.6 
Intra-tribal disturbances were struggles for supremacy or status among the leaders of 
local society; inter-tribal encounters were over control of resources for group security. 
The headhunting and ethnic feuding practices of the mountain tribes in Luzon are 
examples of this second category. The blood feuds and vendettas that exist to this day in 
some parts of the Philippines, called rido, are residual evidence of this historical practice. 
There was also a ritualistic element in the violence of pre-Hispanic Philippines. In pre-
colonial Southeast Asia, Tony Day reports, “men of prowess” resorted to violence when 
they sought vengeance, prestige, manpower, and wealth.7 Clifford Geertz used the term 
‘theater state’ when he referred to the rituals and ceremonies of pre-colonial Bali. Ritual, 
he argued, holds the state together in Southeast Asia, as opposed to force in Europe.8  
 
 Over time, tribal violence metamorphosed into rebellion against central authority, 
first against the foreign colonizers, then against a government composed of other 
Filipinos. In part this transformation can be explained by the Philippines’ colonial 
experience – the forging through more than 300 years of struggle of the Filipino 
revolutionary heritage. Yet many societies which can claim to have similar historical 
experiences have successfully made the transition from traditional to modern states. The 
Philippines remains in the turbulent mid-stream of socio-political transformation.  
 
 The communist and Moro rebellions are the present day manifestation of a 
historical thread of internal violence – from intertribal encounters to secessionist 
movements -  that has been a constant feature of the Philippine socio-political terrain. 
                                                 
6 Samuel K. Tan,The Bangsamoro Struggle. UP Forum Online. Official Publication of the University of the 
Philippines, Tomo 1, Blg. 7, May/June 2000.  
7 Tony Day cites Battye 1974 and Wolters 1999 in Violence and Beauty, Chapter 5 in : Fluid Iron: State 
Formation in Southeast Asia.  
8 Clifford Geertz. “Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali”.1990. Princeton University 
Press. NJ.    
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Today the insurgencies continue to pose a serious obstacle to the development and 
progress of Philippine society. The country’s economic growth and development has 
been severely impeded by losses in human capital, reduced investments, destruction of 
infrastructure and disruption of markets.9 The colonizers ultimately left the Philippines in 
the hand of an elite group cultivated by themselves, so that post-colonial Philippines 
much resembled colonial Philippines, only without foreign rule.  When confronted with 
rebellion, colonizers typically fight at first, only to abandon their investments.  Foreign 
occupiers sought to extract economic gains from the Philippines, but sparked resistance 
to their rule.  After their departure, even Filipino rulers would be forced to fight, at the 
same time they sought to develop, the Philippines. 
 
A. SPANISH ARRIVAL  
 
 When Spain began colonization of the Philippines in 1565, the inhabitants who 
lived in the fragmented and self-governed villages in the islands did not see themselves as 
part of a centralized and cohesive whole. These pre-colonial communities were held 
together by kinship. An early account describes the inhabitants of Luções (Luzon) as 
“nearly all heathen; they have no king but are ruled by groups of elders.”10  In the south, 
in some parts of Mindanao and in the island of Sulu, Islam had been introduced in the late 
15th century. It arrived by way of Indonesia though traders and proselytizers. By the early 
16th century Muslim sultanates were firmly established in some parts of Mindanao and a 
proto-sultanate was developing in Manila to the north. The Muslim elite had strong ties 
with the rulers of Borneo and may have been related by kinship. Filipino folklore 
recounts the saga of the ten Bornean datus who migrated to the Philippines in the 12th 
century.11  In any event, until the coming of the Spaniards, the inhabitants of the islands 
looked west – to Borneo and to China - for cultural illumination.  
 
                                                 
9, James Murdoch and Todd Sandler. Economic Growth, Civil Wars and Spatial Spillovers. Paper funded in 
part by DRG, WB. July 2001.  
10 Tomė Pires. The Hakluyt Society. The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires and the Book of Francisco 
Rodrigues. Original 1515, reprinted by Kraus Reprint Ltd., Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 1967. p. 133 
11 Village chief. This saga is based on oral history and has not been confirmed by archeological evidence.  
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 Although ‘discovered’ in 1521 by Magellan, colonization of the Philippines only 
began more than forty years later with the arrival from Mexico of an expedition led by 
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. The Spaniards alternatively used guile and coercion to 
colonize the islands. They quickly defeated the nascent Manila sultanate ruled by Rajah 
Sulayman and on its site established the colonial capital. Colonial policy pursued three 
objectives in the Philippines - to acquire a share in the spice trade, to develop trade with 
Japan and China and to convert the natives to Christianity.12  These policies would have 
profound repercussions on the political and social development of the islands. The 
colonizers quickly realized that the islands did not have the spices of the Moluccas or the 
silver and gold mines of South America. Under colonial rule the Philippines simply 
became Spain’s outpost for competition with other European rivals. Its internal 
development was neglected because of pre-occupation with imperial concerns. Although 
the colonization of the natives was met with little initial resistance, when force was 
required the colonial power applied a policy of divide et imperia by employing natives 
from one region to subjugate another. 
 
   
 Under Spain religion provided identify and became the first homogenizing glue 
that began to integrate the widely dispersed tribes under a single authority. Religious 
pageantry reinforced the natives’ propensity for ritual, symbolism and superstition. It 
facilitated their conversion. Although they spoke a wide variety of dialects unintelligible 
to each other, they recognized one another as fellow Christians. Because it was imposed 
rather than freely embraced, religion was a weak and fragile bond. This identify, of 
course, was not shared by the Muslims.    
  
 The Muslims in the south, with a more advanced socio-political organization were 
more successful in resisting colonization. The Spaniards lumped all Muslims together as 
‘moros’, after their erstwhile adversaries in the reconquista and derisively called the 
other natives ‘indios’. In their encounters against colonial intrusions the Muslims were 
                                                 
12 Philippine Army: The 1st 100 Years. 1997. Philippine Army publication,  henceforth  PhilArmy 100 
Years. 
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often pitted against the Christianized natives whom the colonizers employed as 
auxiliaries. Formerly fraternal, the relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims 
(and now Christians) became one of resentment and suspicion.13 No permanent colonial 
presence was established in Sulu until the mid-1800s.  
 
 The Muslims or Moros retaliated against the Spanish attacks with slaving raids on 
coastal Christian towns and villages all over the archipelago. Coastal villages were razed 
and most of their population sold into slavery. Maritime raiding was already an 
established activity in the Sulu zone even before the period of colonization. Slaving raids 
became especially ferocious during the hundred years from about mid-1700s on. These 
raids, which were conducted mainly by the Iranun-Balangingi, a seagoing Muslim tribe 
from Sulu, “severely hampered the overall social and material well-being and growth of 
the Philippine island world and the colonial state.”14 It was mainly from this period that 
the image of the Moros as backward and predatory developed among Christians. Divided 
by faith, they eventually became two cultures apart.  
 
 1.  The Early Revolts 
 
 It did not take long for the converted natives to revolt.  In the northern and central 
parts of the archipelago, numerous revolts broke out as the natives resented their loss of 
freedom and the abuses of the colonizers. These revolts followed a certain pattern. The 
earlier revolts, which occurred in the late 16th century, were anti-invasion, intended to 
eject the colonizers. Most of these early revolts sought aid from outside powers like 
Brunei or even Japan.15 The succeeding revolts during the 17th century were directed 
against specific colonial practice like reduccion - the forced relocation of the populations 
and against maltreatment- and polo – forced labor. Some revolts of this period were 
atavistic, led by self-styled religious leaders who called for a rejection of Catholicism and 
                                                 
13 Cesar A. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines. 1999. University of the Philippines Press. Quezon City, 
Philippines.  
14 James Francis Warren. Iranun Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity. 
Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd. Singapore, 2002.  
15 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Tala Publishing Services, Quezon City, 1975 
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a return to animist practice. The Tamblot, Bankaw and Tapar revolts were typical of this 
type.  The Chinese, too, who had established an important commercial presence in 
Manila, revolted against the colonial authorities in the mid-17th century. Except for the 
Dagohoy revolt in Bohol island which lasted 85 years, all revolts were short lived and 
isolated.  
 
 2.  The Rise of a National Elite 
 
The isolated and peripheral nature of the early revolts changed when a national 
elite emerged in the 19th century. The local elite, called the principalia, where the 
descendants of the village chiefs or datus who were co-opted by the Spanish colonial 
authorities to help administer the villages in their behalf. 16 These community leaders 
were called cabezas de barangay or gobernadorcillos. The actual number of Spaniards in 
the islands was miniscule compared to the native population. The colonial authorities 
ruled by creating a core of local collaborators. The policy of indirect rule did not require 
a massive bureaucracy and the distance from Spain discouraged many peninsular 
Spaniards from making the voyage. A book published in 1870 records the number of 
Spanish speakers as only 2.8% of the population, then estimated at 4.5 million.17 Since 
this included natives who learned the language, the actual number must have been 
smaller. Indirect rule is a colonial policy, also applied by the British in India, of ruling   
through a native bureaucracy. However, unlike the British, Spain did not create a civil 
service; it created an elite.  
 
Up to 1815 colonial economic focus was on the  trade between China and Mexico 
which passed through the Philippines. Little was done to develop the islands until the 19th 
century when export crops such as sugar, tobacco, indigo and abaca fiber began to be 
cultivated in earnest. With the introduction of commercial agriculture, the cabezas and 
gobernadorcillos began to accumulate wealth and status. Certain privileges were 
                                                 
16 Constantino, op. cit. 
17 Agustin de Cavada quoted in “Statistics: The Spanish Language in the Philippines”, Circulo Hispano-
Filipino. http://de.geocities.com/hispanofilipino/Articles/Estadisticas02Eng.html  accessed 21 October 
2003.  
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extended to them as incentive for their participation in the colonial administration. 
Enjoying their economic status, they sought to solidify their position in society by 
emulating the colonizers. They sent their children to school, some to Europe, where they 
absorbed the ideas of liberalism then sweeping the continent. These Western-educated 
scions of the principalia were called illustrados. Jose Rizal, the national hero, was one of 
these European educated illustrados.  
 
 The real powers in the islands were the curates. It was through religion rather than 
through force that Spain colonized the Philippines and it was the friars who constituted 
the colonial cadre. Renato Constantino in his paper “Identity and Consciousness: The 
Philippine Experience”, recounts the clerical boast that “in each friar in the Philippines 
the king had a captain general and a whole army”.18 The curates exerted more influence 
over the natives than the colonial government because they were less concerned with 
commercial enterprises and more with converting the heathen and saving souls. However, 
some religious orders did have considerable landholdings and commercial interests but 
still pursued their evangelical role.     
 
 3.  From Reform to Revolution 
 
 The returning illustrados sought to correct the difference between European and 
Philippine societies. The freedom they enjoyed in the continent contrasted sharply with 
the repression and abuse they saw at home. At first, they sought reform, proposing to 
incorporate the Philippines as a province of Spain and representation in parliament. 
Philippine historians called this the Propaganda Movement and their composition was 
illustrative of the national elite. Jose Rizal, Graciano Lopez-Jaena and Marcelo del Pilar 
came from different regions in the Philippines, but they converged on a common purpose 
– reform of colonial policy.  
 
                                                 
18 Renato Constantino, “Identity and Consciousness: The Philippine Experience”, paper presented in 
Symposium 3 of the VIII World Sociology Congress, Toronto, Canada, August 20, 1974. He quotes from 
Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residio en acquel pais, Madrid, 1898, p. 59 
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 In 1872, an insurrection by native auxiliaries in Cavite, near Manila, was brutally 
crushed by the colonial authorities. In the witch hunt that followed many innocent 
Filipinos were executed. The most prominent of these were three Filipino priests whose 
only crime was advocating for a liberalization of Church policy on native priests.19 Many 
in the propaganda movement saw in the events of 1872 hopelessness in reform and began 
to turn to revolution.  
 
 4.  The Katipunan and Filipino Nationalism 
 
 Andres Bonifacio, the leader of first national revolution was a self-educated 
individual of humble origins who was inspired by the examples of the French and 
American revolutions. He founded a secret society called the Katipunan which was to 
become the nucleus of the revolutionary army against Spain.20 The plot was divulged to 
the colonial authorities and the revolution was launched prematurely in 1896. Unlike 
previous revolts, the revolution of 1896 was widespread, covering all the provinces 
surrounding Manila, with sympathetic outbreaks in the rest of Luzon and the Visayas. 
The membership of the Katipunan was estimated at 30,000 men. 21 Fighting, however, 
was inconclusive and by 1897, an illustrado, Emilio Aguinaldo, having gained 
prominence because of his successes against the Spaniards, had replaced Bonifacio as 
leader of the revolution. 22 In the stalemate that ensued, the colonial authorities convinced 
Aguinaldo to agree to an armistice on the promise of reform. After much debate, 
Aguinaldo agreed and left for exile in Hong Kong, as part of the agreement.   
 
 Leon Maria Guerrero in his biography of Rizal claims that it was only during the 
revolution of 1896 that the natives began calling themselves as ‘Filipinos’, a term 
normally used to refer to Spaniards born on the islands.23  Previous to these, the natives 
                                                 
19 These priests were Fathers Gomez, Burgos and Zamora.  
20 Kagalanggalangand, Katastaasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan or Honorable and Supreme 
Society of the Sons the People.  
21 Phil. Army 100 Years 
22 Bonifacio was tried and executed after a political falling out with Aguinaldo.  
23 Leon Maria Guerrero. The First Filipino. 2000, Guerrero Pubishing, Makati, Philippines.   
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identified themselves according to tribe and language, e.g., Tagalog, Visayan or 
Pampango. To the Spaniards, they were either indio or moro.  
 
 Until the 19th century, Spain’s developmental policy towards the islands was one 
of extracting the greatest gain at the least cost. Local development, including that of the 
natives, was kept only to a bare minimum. Education, for example, was limited to the 
elite. This explains why Spanish is not as widely spoken in the Philippines as in other 
former Spanish colonies. With the growth of global trade led by the mercantile nations of 
England and the United States, agricultural development of the islands improved as did 
the wealth and patriotic aspirations of the natives. Nevertheless, except for the Moros, it 
was under a colonial power that the first semblance of consolidation of the islands was 
achieved. 
 
B. AMERICAN COLONY 
 
 When the Spanish-American war broke out in 1898, American naval forces under 
Commodore Dewey easily defeated the rusting Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Dewey’s 
victory revived Aguinaldo’s stalled revolution. Momentarily without any presence on 
land, American officials initially supported Aguinaldo’s drive to surround Intramuros, 
the walled section of Manila, while awaiting the arrival of U.S. troops. Unknown to the 
Filipinos, the Americans and the Spaniards worked out an arrangement that would allow 
Spain “to save face and to satisfy a medieval code of honor.” The Spaniards also feared 
that the Filipinos would massacre the inhabitants if allowed into the city. This 
arrangement would leave out the Filipino revolutionary army that had ringed the city 
while American troops were still in transit from California. Through a promise of more 
and better arms, which later turned out to be false, American commanders convinced 
Filipino troops surrounding Intramuros to hand over their positions to American forces. 
On August 13, 1898 the Filipino army watched on the sidelines as Intramuros, the Walled 
City, and the object of all their sacrifice, fell into American hands – a sham battle 
between ‘civilized’ nations.24  
                                                 
24 Phil. Army 100 Years.  
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 Earlier in June of that year Aguinaldo declared independence although this was 
not recognize the by United States. With Intramuros now occupied and about 25,000 US 
troops in the Philippines, the Americans demanded that the Filipinos vacate their 
positions around Manila and limit their approach to the city only up to certain points.  
Fighting inevitably broke out between the US Army and the Katipunan in February 1899. 
At this time the Katipunan numbered about 20,000, with only 5,000 armed with firearms. 
The rest were armed with bolos, spears and bows and arrows.   
 
 The war that followed was marked by cruelty and brutality with the Filipinos on 
the losing end. The Katipunan was quickly shattered as a conventional force and in 
November 1899 the Filipinos shifted to guerilla warfare. In conducting an anti-guerilla 
campaign, the Americans applied methods that had severe effects on the civilian 
populace. Entire villages were burned and their inhabitants forcibly relocated into 
restricted ‘concentration camps’ to prevent them from supporting the guerillas. Tens of 
thousands died in these camps.  
 
 What the Americans would call the Philippine Insurrection (the Filipinos called it 
the Philippine-American War) was formally declared over by the new colonial authorities 
in July 1902. It cost the lives of 4,234 Americans. Filipino deaths are estimated at 20,000 
Katipuneros and between 200,000 to 1 million civilians. Manuel Arellano Remondo 
writes in 1908 that the population had decreased by 1 million ‘due to the wars’.25  
 
 1.  The Pacification Campaign 
  
 Revolts against the Americans continued. Some of these resembled the earlier 
revolts against the Spaniards in that they were led by quasi-religious leaders. Most of 
                                                 
25 Manuel Arellano Remondo, General Geography of the Philippine Islands, 1908. Typographic College of 
Santo Tomas, Manila. P. 15, cited in “Statistics: The Spanish Language in the Philippines”, Circulo 
Hispano-Filipino at http://de.geocities.com/hispanofilipino/Articles/Estadisticas02Eng.html.  The figure of 
200,000 is from Gregorio Zaide. Philippine Political and Cultural History, 1972. Manila: Philippine 
Education Company. 
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these were remnants of the Katipunan who were declared bandits by the American 
colonial authorities. The Americans also dealt the Moros aspirations for a separate state a 
fatal blow in 1913 in the Battle of Bud Bagsak. During the 1930s the Sakdal revolt 
erupted in Central Luzon. It was the first uprising that was based on agrarian unrest. The 
authorities had to call out the Philippine Constabulary, a paramilitary force, to quell the 
Sakdal revolt. By 1915 the entire archipelago was incorporated into a single territory until 
granted independence by the United States in 1946.  
 
 2.  Effects of the American Occupation 
 
Under American rule universal education was introduced and English became the 
unifying language that further bound the different parts of the Philippines, including the 
Moros,  under a single authority. The influence of the Catholic Church was considerably 
reduced. All the remaining armed opposition to American rule, whether revolutionary 
remnants or rebels-turned-bandits, were slowly eliminated. The Americans introduced 
participatory democracy. A National Assembly was convened from popularly elected 
candidates. The Americans left intact, however, the local elite who had continued to 
perform their roles as collaborators with the colonizers. 
 
C.  WORLD WAR II 
 
 After the defeat of the Allied forces in Bataan and Corregidor, many Filipinos 
simply fell back on their revolutionary heritage and joined the underground movements 
against the Japanese. The Philippines, along with all of Southeast Asia, fell within 
Japan’s East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The most effective of these guerilla 
organizations was the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon (People’s Anti-Japanese 
Army or Hukbalahap) or simply, the Huks. Benedict Kerkvliet in his book The Huk 
Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines wrote that many guerilla 
organizations sprang up all over the islands but the Huks in Central Luzon were among 
the most active and effective anti-Japanese guerilla forces in the Philippines, if not the 
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entire Pacific.26 The Huks did not have to follow Allied directives. One of these directives 
advised restraint on the part of guerilla groups to avoid Japanese reprisals on the populace. 
One effect of the WWII guerilla movements was the proliferation of firearms all over the 
Philippines. The Allies continued to supply weapons to guerilla bands all over the islands 
and many of these were used for other purposes like the elimination of political rivals and 
personal vendettas.   
 
 As in the rest of Asia, the defeat of Western colonizers by an Asian power 
shattered the myth of invincibility of the colonial masters. The spectacle, deliberately 
staged by the Japanese, of former European masters reduced to abject conditions 
remained indelible in the minds of many colonial subjects. Europeans can be defeated.  
After World War II, in quick succession, the nations in Southeast Asia emerged as 
independent states. The Philippines was no exception. Its march to independence had 
started in 1935 and was only interrupted by World War II.  
 
 In July 4, 1946, with its capital city still in ruins and its populace still dazed by the 
violence and destruction of the liberation, the Philippines achieved independence. 
 
 Some historians report that in the colonial history of the Philippines more than 
200 revolts occurred.27  It is evident that violent resistance against central authority is 
common enough in Philippine history that every single generation of Filipinos has either 
participated in or had knowledge of a revolt during his lifetime. This historical record of 
revolts and uprisings created what Tan called the Filipinos’ “revolutionary heritage”.28  
Beneath the veneer of unity lies the fragile Filipino national project. It provides some 
explanation for the frequency of revolts in the islands and the propensity of its inhabitants 
to challenge or ignore central government. 
                                                 
26 Benedict J. Kerkvliet. “The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines”. 1977. 
University of California Press, LA.  
27 Jose Maria Sison, Philippine Society and Revolution. Communist Party of the Philippines publication, 
1970. Due to the underground nature of the Communist Party of the Philippines at the time Sison’s works 
were published, and even up to today, no publishing data except the date of publications was available. 
Sison himself wrote under the pseudonym Amado Guerrero. Most of Sison’s works are available at the 
CPP website: http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cpp/index.shtml 
28 Tan, op cit.  
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 The colonial authorities, both Spanish and American, brooked no internal dissent. 
Rebellions were suppressed and its perpetrators were severely punished. The American 
occupation, for example, included a period called the pacification campaign which lasted 
up to 1913. It is no accident that during this period Philippine society reached a level of 
development and sophistication that surpassed any of its regional neighbors in the then  






III.  THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 
 
 Communism as a political ideology was introduced in the Philippines during the 
1930’s and found many adherents among the impoverished tenant farmers of Central 
Luzon and the small but growing number of workers in Manila. The local communist 
movement would always present itself as a mass-based, nationalistic, anti-imperialist 
movement. In its early stages its leaders were heavily influenced by global developments 
such as the communist victories in China and Vietnam and the wars of national liberation 
in former colonial possessions.  The communist-led insurgency continues to thrive 
because the Government has not adequately addressed the economic and social 
conditions that are its root causes.  
 
 On two previous occasions, leaders of the local communist movements seriously 
misjudged the existence of so-called revolutionary situations. In 1950, the Partido 
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) “concluded that a revolutionary situation existed” based 
on an analysis of the U.S. economy made by a top Soviet economist.29 This analysis 
argued that the U.S. economy was crumbling and that U.S. imperialism was about to 
collapse. In 1970, Sison wrote: “We are in an era when imperialism is heading for total 
collapse and socialism is marching toward world victory.”30 
 
A. THE HUK REBELLION  
 
 The Huk rebellion, which lasted from 1946 to 1950, was the first widespread 
armed rebellion in an independent Philippines and it had an ideological component 
identified with communism. According to Benedict Kerkvliet, the deterioration of 
traditional ties between landlords and peasants in Central Luzon enabled the Huk 
rebellion.31 Modernization was the cause. By adopting ‘modern’ values and methods, 
landlords began to neglect what the peasants believed to be their duty to the “little 
                                                 
29 Kerkvliet, p. 225 
30 Sison, 1970.   
31 Kerkvliet, op cit., observes that even Sison, founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, misses 
this detail in his work Philippine Society and Revolution.  
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people”, such as giving aid and assistance. Instead, the landlords demanded interests for 
loans and formal contracts for business transactions from the tenants. The tenant farmers 
of Central Luzon did not seek a redistribution of the land; this was the idea of the PKP 
(Philippine Communist Party).  They wanted a return to the old patron-client system.  
Ominously, population growth in Central Luzon made arable land less and less available. 
In the province of Nueva Ecija the population more than doubled in 30 years.32 The 
rebellion grew out of the Sakdal peasant-based agrarian unrest in pre-war Central Luzon.  
Many Huks had been members of the Sakdal and the other peasant movements before the 
war. The major factor that made a difference between pre-war peasant unrest and the Huk 
rebellion was the availability of firearms left over from World War II.  By the end of 
1944 there were between 10,000 to 12,000 Huk guerillas organized into 76 squadrons. 33   
  
 The Philippine government, with extensive US military assistance, waged a 
successful two-pronged campaign against the Huks. It was led by the charismatic Ramon 
Magsaysay, who was later to become the President. Magsaysay’s campaign, which 
employed military operations and attraction programs applied in combination, effectively 
defeated the Huks as a military force by 1951.34 This was an early example of the fight-
and-develop strategy and evidently heavily influenced subsequent administrations. In 
truth, the strategy was more fight than develop because the attraction program was 
merely icing on the cake since the number of beneficiaries were only a fraction of the 
entire Huk movement. The U. S. assistance, for example, was purely military in nature. 
But government propaganda made sure that every case of a Huk beneficiary was widely 
heard.35 
 
 Magsaysay’s efforts included military reform and a policy of attraction for the 
Huks. He re-organized and streamlined the armed forces and sacked non-performing 
commanders while rewarded those who did well. He created the Economic Development 
Corps (EDCOR) which included a resettlement and homestead program. Many 
                                                 
32 Kerkvliet, p. 19 
33 Equivalent to company 
34 Kerkvliet, Op cit.  
35 Kerkvliet cites Jose Crisol, who worked under Magsaysay, for this admission.  
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surrendered Huks were relocated to Mindanao and given land. Ironically. this influx of 
Huk (Christian) settlers into Mindanao would exacerbate the brewing Muslim-Christian 
conflict on the island.   
   
  
B.  THE CPP/NPA  
 
 The CPP and the NPA are direct descendants of the earlier PKP and Huks.36 Like 
the Huks before them, the leaders of the CPP determined in the late 1960’s that a 
revolutionary situation existed in the Philippines. Developments elsewhere, in Vietnam 
and China (in the midst of its Cultural Revolution) in particular, prompted Filipino 
communists to consider the possibilities for their own revolution. The split between the 
PKP and the CPP was due to differences in ideology and method which reflected the split 
within the Communist world little understood in the West at that time. The PKP was 
Moscow-oriented and adhered to a proletariat-based insurrection that would take place in 
the cities. The CPP followed Mao’s (Beijing) theory of agrarian (countryside) and 
peasant-based protracted armed struggle. Further, after the defeat of the Huks, the PKP 
opted for parliamentary struggle. The NPA broke away from the Huks and became the 
CPP’s military arm.   
   
 1.  A Deliberate Strategy of Protracted War 
 
 From its founding, the NPA has openly declared that its strategy was to wage a 
protracted people’s war. In 1974 Jose Maria Sison, founder of the Communist Party of 
the Philippines, wrote: “Our people’s war is protracted. It shall take a long period of time 
to change the balance of forces between us and the enemy.”37 This strategy in itself does 
not fully explain why the communist insurgency has lasted so long because the prospect 
of a 30-plus years struggle would have been a daunting prospect to any revolutionary. 
                                                 
36 Many of the founding members of the CPP and the NPA were former PKP and HMB members.  Among 
these were Jose Maria Sison, founder of the CPP, and Bernabe Buscayno, founder of the NPA. 
37 Jose Maria Sison. Our Urgent Tasks. 1974. Communist Party of the Philippines publication.  Italics 
supplied. 
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Nevertheless it provides context to the hard line stance taken by the communist in 
transactions with the Government.  
 
 In 1988, the CPP anniversary statement had read: “The key to total victory within 
the next ten years is the militant all-sided participation and support of the broad masses of 
the people in their tens of millions and through organizations whose membership run into 
millions.”38 (italics supplied).  
 
 Ten years later, with victory still un-attained, the anniversary message read: “The 
domestic semi-colonial and semi-feudal ruling system and the world capitalist system are 
now in the throes of an unprecedented crisis.”39 
   
 During the 34th anniversary of its founding in December 26, 2002, the CPP 
announced that they would “outlast President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo” and that “the 
CPP and the revolutionary movement have become stronger and are in a more favorable 
position to advance in large strides, rapidly and comprehensively in the coming years” 
and that the NPA would "carry out more numerous, more frequent and bigger tactical 
offensives against the AFP and other fascist machineries in 2003."40 Peace negotiations 
between the government and the communists have been an on-again, off-again affair for 
years but have largely been inconclusive. The NPA continues its attacks on civilian 
government installations and recalcitrant ‘tax payers’ all over the country. While the level 
of violence has not approached 1985, the year of heaviest casualties, NPA related 
violence have been on the increase. The US and some European nations have tagged the 
CPP a terrorist organization.  
  
                                                 
38Communist Party of the Philippines statement on the 20th anniversary of its re-establishment: 
http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cpp/astm/1988/1988e03.shtml 
39 30th Anniversary Statement of the CP of the Philippines at :  
http://cpa2.netfirms.com/Struggle/June99/14.htm 
40 Statement of Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal, Spokesperson, Communist Party of the Philippines, on 
December 25, 2002 at http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-
bin/statements/statements.pl?author=kr;date=021225;language=rel 
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 Today, with the Soviet Union gone and China reaping the rewards of free-market 
reforms, these statements appear quaint, even ludicrous. Yet these official party 
declarations are consistent with the protracted revolutionary war strategy.     
 
 2.  The Influence of 3rd Parties 
 
 The NPA is almost totally independent, self-supporting and self-directed. Except 
for ideological support from ‘fraternal’ communist parties, almost all rebel weapons and 
revenues are generated in-country. This independence is both a blessing and a bane.  
Sison recognized the proximity of the Philippines to the “great invincible political rear 
made up of the People’s Republic of China,” but NPA attempts to smuggle in arms from 
China ended in failure.41 There have been no further efforts or attempts to smuggle in 
arms either from China or North Korea. 
 
 When the NPA sent a delegation to Beijing in 1973 to negotiate for arms 
assistance, Beijing required the Filipino communists to keep a low profile and limited 
their contact with others. This was a great disappointment to Sison who hoped to use the 
event as a propaganda coup. It was the only instance of a 3rd party dictating on the 
NPA.42  
 
 Lack of a major and reliable source of arms is serious obstacle that prevents NPA 
victory over the AFP. Time alone will not provide this crucial requirement which was not 
a problem with the Chinese and Vietnamese conflicts. The NPA intends to use the 
protracted duration to generate military superiority by smuggling in firearms, by 
capturing war material from the AFP or by causing massive defections. The empirical 
evidence indicates that this is not happening.  
 
                                                 
41 Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the op cit. In mid-1972 the NPA loaded a fishing trawler, renamed 
the Karagatan, with 1,200 automatic rifles, ammunition and anti-tank weapons from China and attempted 
to land it surreptitiously in the Philippines. The effort was discovered and thwarted. Another effort in 
January 1974 also ended in failure.  Since then no arms smuggling has been reported.  
42 Jones, op cit.  
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 Referring to civil war duration Paul Collier argues that “economic agendas appear 
to be central” to civil conflict and that “it is likely that some groups are benefiting from 
the conflict and that these groups therefore have some interest in initiating and sustaining 
it”.43 This is true in the case of the NPA because it has ‘discovered’ other sources of 
revenue which can only be fully exploited under conditions of civil conflict, like criminal 
activities and exercising rebel sovereignty.  
 
 The NPA has resorted to criminal activities like kidnapping, robbery and extortion. 
NPA spokesman, Gregorio Rosal, claims that the NPA intensified its extortion activities 
after the United States and the European Union declared the movement a terrorist 
organization and froze its funds in 2002.44 In February 2003, Rodolfo S. Salas, who 
headed the NPA from 1976 until his arrest in  1986 admitted that in 1986 the Executive 
Committee of the Party’s Central Committee had directed the NPA General Command to 
resort to “criminal acts to raise funds”.45   
 
 Ironically, the NPA also collects permit-to-campaign fees from electoral 
candidates campaigning in their influenced areas. In July 2003, the NPA spokesman in 
Abra province in Luzon announced that it was collecting permit-to-campaign fees for the 
2004 elections.46 Bus and other transportation companies are lucrative sources of funds 
since their assets are vulnerable to rebel attacks. In the province of Negros Occidental the 
NPA burned nine busses and bombed a cellular telephone station in 2002 and 2003.47 Bus 
companies are assessed approximately P5 million a year. From the gold mines in Davao 
del Norte the NPA collects from one mining firm alone an annual subsidy of P 1.5 billion 
(about $27 million).48  
 
                                                 
43 Collier, 1999, p. 1.   
44 Palangchao, Harley in SunStar on Line, 19 July 2003 issue. 
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2003/07/19/would.be.bets.told.don.t.pay.npa.campaign.fee.html  - 
accessed 29 October 2003. 
45 Rodolfo Salas statement in Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 February 2003.   
46 Harley Palangchao, in Manila Times, 26 July 2003.  
47 Gilbert Bayoran in The Visayan Daily Star, 23 August 2003.  
48 Information from AFP intelligence source. 
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 These resource generating activities makes the NPA relatively free of  3rd party 
influence. 
 
 Twice negotiations between the government and the CPP/NPA were conducted. 
Negotiations were immediately attempted following Marcos’ downfall. But in 1987 the 
CPP/NPA broke off negotiations when a farmers’ demonstration ended in violence which 
claimed 13 lives.49 In 2001, it was the government’s turn to break off negotiations when 
the NPA assassinated two congressmen with ‘blood debts’. Since then the CPP/NPA was 
tagged as a terrorist organization by the United States and some European nations. 
Although both sides profess to be willing, negotiations have not been resumed. At present 
(2003) preparations are being made to resume negotiations with the NPA under the 
auspices of Norwegian government.    
 
C.  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE  
 
 Aside from negotiations, the government has attempted to address the root causes 
of the insurgency. Its counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is imbedded in what it calls its 
social reform agenda. Together with military operations, land reform and poverty 
alleviation are the components of this program to eliminate the root causes of the 
communist-led rebellion.    
 
 1.  Land Reform 
 
 The fundamental flaw of any land reform program in the Philippines is that there 
is increasingly insufficient land to be distributed to an increasing number of farmer-
beneficiaries. Only about a third of the country’s 30 million hectares are classified as 
arable and the country’s population growth is among the highest in the world. There are 
an estimated 12 million agricultural workers in the country. When Marcos was ousted in 
1986, the government of Corazon Aquino vowed to make land reform the centerpiece of 
                                                 
49 Darwin G. Almojelar,, “Remembering the Mendiola Massacre” in The Manila Times, January 26, 2003 at 
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/jan/26/weekend/20030126wek4.html 
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her administration. What emerged as the Comprehensive Land Reform Law (CARL) in 
1987 was a watered down version emasculated by landlord influence in the legislature. 
Initially the program identified 10.3 million hectares of land that was distributable; this 
was later corrected during the Ramos administration to 8.06 million. Accounting for 
actual ownership is one problem which besets the CARP program. From 1986 to 1999, 
2.97 million hectares were distributed to 2.1 million farmer-beneficiaries. Whatever the 
scheme or scale of distribution, the land-to-the-tiller strategy remains a powerful tool 
against an agrarian unrest. Considering that the Philippines is not a socialist society, nor 
revolutionary or dictatorial, this achievement is still significant.50  However, it is not 
sufficient to douse agrarian restiveness.   
 
 2.  Poverty Alleviation  
 
 Sustained economic growth was identified by government planners as the main 
tool against poverty. In order to reduce poverty from 36% in 1994 to 30% by 1998, 
annual GDP growth had to be at least 5.8%. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 derailed 
this plan. Progress in poverty alleviation has been modest. In fact, the number of poor 
increased from 4.6 million in 1985 to 5.24 million in 2000.51  Poverty alleviation has 
been hampered by political instability, poor peace and order conditions and external 
economic shocks. This is a component of the Government’s COIN campaign that has not 
been successful. The case of the Bondoc peninsula illustrates why fight-and-develop as a 
strategy tends to fail against the NPA.  
 
 The Bondoc Peninsula is located in Quezon province, about 180 kilometers south 
of Manila. Because of government neglect, the area has poor infrastructure and poverty is 
rampant. The NPA found it ideal as a guerilla sanctuary. In 1988, the government, with 
assistance from the German government, launched a development project that would 
improve the road system and increase agricultural productivity. The NPA felt threatened 
                                                 
50 Land Reform in the Philippines, Land Research Action Network. – April 9, 2003. 
http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=74 
51 Orbeta quotes Reyes, 2000. 
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by the road project, concluding that it would benefit military forces more than the local 
inhabitants. Through the National Democratic Front, it lobbied with the German 
government against the road project and succeeded. The funds were diverted towards 
agrarian reform, coastal resource management, health care, and enterprise development. 
It did not include roads.  
 
 A special report by The Manila Times in October 2002 quotes an official of the 
National Economic and Development Authority as saying that:  
 
…all efforts in increasing agricultural production through new 
technologies are hampered by inaccessibility of inputs and markets for 
produce, major difficulty in marketing agricultural production due to lack 
of farm-to-market roads and lack of irrigation facilities.52 
 
 The extent of NPA extortion, which they call “revolutionary taxation”, has 
imposed an additional burden on business and discouraged would-be investors, keeping 
the area under developed and in poverty.  
 
 Concludes the same report:  
 
The communist insurgency is the single biggest reason why Quezon 
province remains a backwater in terms of economic growth and 
development. Potential business and development investors are wary of 
putting money in Quezon despite its vast potential because of the rebels’ 
strong presence there and the ‘revolutionary’ taxes they exact (sic). 
 
 But other developments also work in the communists’ favor. From 1970 to 1996, 
the year before the Asian financial crisis, while the average annual per capita GDP 
growth for Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia was 5.4%, the Philippines 
averaged .1% - the lowest in East Asia. Sødal calls this performance a “catastrophe” and 
attributes it to “severe security problems”.  The causal direction cannot be clearly 
established because in the decade of 1960-1970 when the both insurgencies were still 
                                                 
52 Dave L. Llorito amd Meryl Mae Marcon, “Bondoc Peninsula’s growth stunted by insurgency”, The 
Manila Times Special Report, posted Saturday, October 23, 2002.  
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non-existent, the Philippines already had a lower GDP growth per capita than the three 
other countries (2.1% versus 5.1%), except Indonesia (1.1%).53 Wealth distribution has 
not improved either. From 1985 to 2000, the share of the poorest quintile has decreased 
from 4.8% to 4.7% while the share of the richest quintile has increased from 51.2% to 
54.8%.54 
 
 Aniceto O. Orbeta, Jr. of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
attributes part of this increase in poverty to the country’s frenetic population growth 
which, at 2.3%, is among the highest in the world.  In 1970, the Philippine population 
stood at 35 million; by year-end 2003 this figure is estimated to be 81 million, and by 
2004 will be at 85 million.55 Thus population growth clearly outstrips the modest gains in 
economic performance.  
 
 Economic difficulties notwithstanding, many Filipinos still do not see the NPA as 
the solution to their difficulties. In late 2002 a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, an 
opinion-monitoring firm, revealed that 62% of respondents had no trust in the CPP and 
NPA while 68% desired the continuation of peace talks between the government and the 
communists.56 After 1992 the CPP is no longer an illegal organization but it has not 
established a legal presence like a political party. Candidates with known leftist leanings 
run for office under a different party or under the party-list system.   
                                                 
53 Sigbjørn Sødal. Capitalism, Communism and Confucius? Some Refelctions on Asian Growth and Crisis. 
Research supported by the institutional collaboration between Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia and 
Agder University, Norway and Agder Maritime Research Foundation, Norway. December 15, 2000. Cites 
data from Barro and Lee (1994) and World Bank. 
54 Aniceto C.Orbeta, Jr. Population and Poverty: A Review of the Links, Evidence and Implications for the 
Philippines. Paper prepared for the 2002 Population National Congress, INNOTECH Building, Diliman, 
Q.C., 29 November 2002.  
55 Philippine National Statistics Office mid-range estimate. 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/quickstat/index.html - accessed 1 November 2003.  
56 Sol Jose Vanzi, “Poll: 70% of Filipinos Want Talks with CPP”,  in Newsflash, Manila, December 23, 
2002. -  http://www.newsflash.org/2002/12/hl/hl017187.htm - accessed 30 October 2003. 
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 3.  The Military Campaign 
 
 In terms of measurable output alone, i.e., enemy killed and firearms gained from 
the enemy, the results of the military campaign against the NPA have been favorable to 
the Government.  During the six-year period from 1997 to 2002, AFP records show that 
there were 2,886 engagements with the NPA; 75% of these engagements were initiated 
by government forces.  Since rebel personnel and materiel losses are not readily 
replaceable, these losses must weigh heavily on NPA strength. (See Appendix A – 
Results of Military Operations Against the NPA and the Moros) 
    
 In the early years of the conflict, the AFP adopted a direct and reactive strategy 
that aimed to secure the villages (barangays) from NPA infiltration and the adoption of 
search-and-destroy campaigns against the guerillas57. The strength of the guerillas rose 
dramatically from nine squads in 1969 to about 24,000 members in 1987.58 
 
 In 1988, the AFP adopted a strategy that focused on the guerilla’s political 
infrastructure in the barangays.59  Actual fighting took secondary importance. From a 
high of 8,496 villages in 1987, NPA influence dropped to 984 villages in 1993, a mere 
2% of all the villages nationwide. Likewise, NPA guerilla strength had dropped to about 
6,000 in 1995.60  
 
 The weakness of this approach was that once the soldiers moved on to the next 
village, the barangay relapsed back under NPA control because of the absence of 
government efforts to sustain the gains – ‘development’ did not follow ‘fight’. This led to 
frustration among the soldiers who felt that they alone were holding up against the NPA.  
 
                                                 
57 These campaign plans were called Letters of Instruction (LOIs) Mamamayan (Citizen) and Katatagan 
(Stability) and were based largely on the US pattern in Vietnam. Civic action was central to these 
campaigns.  
58 Corpus, p. 26. 
59 LOI Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) 
60 PhilArmy 100 Years 
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 Not surprisingly the protracted COIN campaign led to the politicization of the 
troops.  Coming from the same background as the barangay people they were trying to 
influence, many soldiers came to realize that, to some extent, the NPA was right - it was 
the Government, especially the politicians, who failed in their duty of providing for the 
public good.  The series of coups against the government in 1986, 1987 and 1989 were 
driven in part by soldier impatience with the pace of reform in government. The leaders 
of the latest military mutiny in July 2003 cited corruption, micromanagement and 
ineffective government as reasons their action.  
 
 By 1991, the communists conducted a re-assessment and launched a rectification 
campaign in 1994. The larger NPA units were dispersed and engagements with 
government troops were avoided. The guerillas concentrated on consolidating and 
strengthening their mass bases. By 2000 their strength was up to 11,000. It is difficult to 
account for the NPA’s recovery. Part of their rectification effort was developing 
countermeasures against the SOT. The NPA could also have benefited from the 
continuing adverse economic conditions in the countryside as a result of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.  
    
D.  STRATEGIES 
 
 Only the Government’s military campaigns shows favorable results and yet the 
insurgency continues to grow. Yet it is not the ineffectiveness of military operations but 
the insufficiency of effort in this field that is to blame.  
 
 Arreguin-Toft proposes that strategic interaction, i.e., how protagonists respond to 
each other, determines outcome in asymmetric conflicts.61 Weak actors tend to win in 
asymmetric conflicts when they apply an indirect strategy against the strong actor’s direct 
strategy. He defines direct strategy as that targeting an enemy’s capacity to fight such as 
his troops, weapons or logistics, while indirect strategy targets an enemy’s will to fight 
such as his sources of food or popular support. But there is one caveat:  a weak actor’s 
                                                 
61 Ivan Arreguin-Toft. “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”. International 
Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001.  
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success in applying an indirect defensive strategy assumes a certain restraint on the part 
of the strong (government) actor.  
 
 The effects of democratic restraint on AFP counter-guerilla operations are in the 
forms of political pressure, constitutional restriction and the influence of non-government 
organizations. The Philippines’ democratic system holds security forces accountable for 
their actions to directly elected political leaders. The AFP is restrained from applying 
barbarism which Arreguin-Toft defines simply as the systematic violation of the laws of 
war in pursuit of a military or political objective. Article XIII of the Philippine 
Constitution specifically recognizes human rights and creates a commission that shall 
“investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights 
violations involving civil and political rights”.62 Population and resource control are a 
milder form of direct strategy against guerillas. By limiting the guerillas’ access to the 
local population (which provides food, information, weapons and recruits to the guerillas) 
security forces are striking at the guerillas’ ability to wage war. Neither control of the 
population nor of food supplies is being applied by the AFP.   
   
 In May 2003, Senator Aquilino Pimentel urged the AFP to “review and modify its 
tactics” and “restrain itself from unleashing its bombs and artillery fire on terrorist targets 
if there is a high risk of hitting innocent civilians.” The government, Pimentel argues, 
cannot “use the same means adopted by terrorists” or it “will be guilty of state-sponsored 
terrorism.”63  Although Pimentel was referring to operations against the MILF, an ever 
greater degree of congressional oversight is applied to operations against the NPA.  
  
 The March 2003 report of the US State Department Bureau of Human Rights, 
Democracy and Labor states that human rights violations in the Philippines were 
perpetrated by both the government security forces and the rebel organizations.64  The 
human rights issue is viewed by many in the AFP as a deliberate weapon applied by the 
                                                 
62 Paragraph 1, Section 18, Article XIII, The Philippine Constitution.  
63Aquilino Pimentel quoted in Minda News a publication of the Mindanao News and Information 
Cooperative Center, Vol. II, No. 22, 29 May 2003.   
64 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices  - 2002,  U.S. Department of State, the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, released on March 31, 2003 
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NPA to blunt legitimate military operations. This perception, together with inadequate 
legal support for the counterinsurgency effort, has led to extrajudicial abuses by the 
security forces.65 The Anti-Subversion law which made the CPP illegal, was rescinded in 
1992. Troops engaged in searches for rebel weapons and suspects have to go through the 
standard police process of applying for a search warrant. Even combat engagements with 
guerilla bands have to be treated as a crime requiring the gathering of evidence. To many 
in the AFP, these legal requirements are simply inadequate to fight a rebellion. 
Nevertheless, the AFP continues to be accountable to the Commander-in-Chief and the 
legislature who are all civilians and chosen by direct election.      
 
E.  NPA DECLINE EXPLAINED 
 
 From 1969 to 1987, the NPA grew prodigiously from a mere 50 guerillas to more 
than 25,000. From there its strength dropped to about 6,000 in 1995 and today (2003) it 
claims strength of about 13,000. This growth is erratic and does not present a steady trend 
towards “uniting the many to oppose the few and isolate and destroy the enemy”.66  
 
 There are at least three other alternative explanations for the decline of NPA 
strength from 1987 to 1994 other than AFP action. First, Marcos was deposed and 
democracy restored. Up to 1986 the NPA was growing at 20% a year and captured NPA 
documents revealed that the rebels were anticipating a shift to the next phase of the 
communist armed struggle. With Marcos gone and in his place an immensely popular 
Corazon Aquino, the communists lost an important hate object. Broader political 
participation defused some of the dissatisfaction that the NPA relied on to fuel their 
rebellion. Second, the Soviet empire collapsed discrediting communism as a viable 
ideology. The implosion of the USSR, the epicenter of the worldwide communist 
movement, caught many by surprise, including the NPA. Doubts began to set in 
                                                 
65 The Philippines does not have an internal security act like some of its neighbors. The Communist Party 
has been legalized after the Anti-Subversion Law was rescinded in 1992.   
66 Sison, op cit. 
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regarding the validity of their cause. Third, the NPA suffered a self-destructive internal 
witch hunt which resulted in the torture and execution of hundreds of its members.67   
  
 The CPP/NPA have not given up their struggle to overthrow the existing 
democratic system by armed struggle, but if their movement is to succeed, the communist 
have to overcome the fundamental problems where to source weapons or war material, 
where to establish an utterly safe sanctuary and how to develop solid popular support. 
These were the very same obstacles that have confronted the MNLF and the Katipunan 
before them.    
 
 Efforts to generate arms from government forces have met with dismal results, 
with the NPA losing more to the government forces. During the period 1997 to 2002, the 
AFP recorded gains of 2,928 high powered firearms versus losing 799 to the NPA68. 
Despite these, however, the NPA claims that it has 13,500 guerillas organized into 27 
battalions and active in 800 towns and 70 provinces.69 
 
 Another source which the NPA hope to tap is massive defections from the AFP. 
This has not happened although there are reports of pilferage and individual sales by 
military personnel, but still not sufficient for a qualitative shift in the military balance. 
There are also cases of individual defections but some of these involved soldiers evading 
punishment for violations of military regulations.    
 
 Many successful guerilla movements had recourse to a sanctuary area where the 
rebels could rest and refit which was invulnerable to pursuing government forces. The 
Chinese communist had this sanctuary in Yennan; the North Vietnamese enjoyed the 
protection of China and the Soviet Union; the FARC in Colombia regularly cross over 
into Venezuela. The NPA does not have such an area although they have always tried to 
create it. In the past it has attempted to establish sanctuaries in the Marag Valley and the 
Bondoc Peninsula, both in Luzon. In both instances, a determined and sustained 
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68 Philippine Army data.  
69 Diego Wadagan quoted by Harley Palangchao in Manila Times, 26 July 2003.  
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government effort to dismantle rebel support infrastructure seriously degraded rebel 
strength in those areas.    
 
 The NPA continues to exist and although it is not strong enough to defeat the 
government it acts as a millstone on Filipino society in general. The fundamental causes 
of the insurgency – poverty and injustice as a result of socio-political and economic 
weaknesses require long-term solutions which have not been made. The NPA itself 
admits that for as long as these fundamental causes are not corrected, the communist 
insurgency will remain. The NPA’s adoption of a protracted war strategy explains their 
willingness to forego negotiations and concessions in exchange for a more complete 
revolutionary victory in the future. Finally, their total independence of 3rd party influence 
gives them the freedom and flexibility to pursue any course of action they wish – 
including continuation of their struggle.  
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IV.  THE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT IN MINDANAO 
  
 The conflict between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao has historical and 
contemporary causes. Competition for land between the original Muslim inhabitants and 
recent Christian settlers was the fundamental cause of what the Government calls the 
“Mindanao Problem”. Since there was historical animosity between the Muslims and the 
Christians, it was not difficult for violence to erupt. However, it was an ill-conceived plot 
to infiltrate neighboring Sabah, in North Borneo, that ignited the present conflict. The 
Philippine Government, first under Marcos and then under Aquino, Ramos and Estrada, 
have applied a mix of military, diplomatic, political and economic measures to resolve 
the problem. Recent developments show promise. Unlike the NPA, the Moros are heavily 
influenced by 3rd parties. Militarily, the MNLF was a defeated force by 1984, but deft 
negotiations and careful orchestration by the MNLF under Nur Misuari and lapses and 
errors on the Government gave the rebels a new lease on life.  
 
A.  THE MORO REBELLION 
 
 The Muslims secessionist movement was caused by economic, political and social 
marginalization of the earlier inhabitants of Mindanao as a result of the continued 
migration of Christians. This demographic shift began during the Commonwealth period 
under the Americans and increased after World War II. It created friction between the 
new settlers and the Muslims. According to Thomas McKenna, the number of Christian 
migrants in Central Mindanao soared from .7 million in 1948 to 2.3 million in 1970. 74 
By 1990 the population of Mindanao was only less than 17% Muslim and about 5% 
nationwide. The new settlers set about acquiring land and the Muslims, who considered 
land as communal property, saw a steady erosion of their domain. Indifferent to the legal 
nuances of land ownership, many Muslims were often outwitted by the more savvy 
settlers. Since the government established and enforced the laws for land ownership, it 
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November 9, 2003.  
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was seen as an instrument of Christian encroachment. By the mid-1960’s the increasing 
tension had broken out into occasional violence.  
 
 Although relations between Christian settlers and Muslims in Mindanao were 
growing increasingly tense, it was a bungled, ill-conceived and supposedly clandestine 
plot to destabilize the Malaysian state of Sabah that broke the camel’s back.  
 
 The Philippine claim to Sabah is a curious twist in history.  It stems from the 
Sultan of Sulu’s historical claim to the territory which was leased to a couple of English 
entrepreneurs in the 19th century and eventually absorbed into the Malay Federation. In 
1963 a UN commission ruled that the inhabitants of Sabah freely expressed their desire to 
be part of Malaysia.75 This was disputed by both the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia 
launched an infiltration effort that came to be known as the konfrontasi.  For the 
Philippines, it was to be Jabidah.  
 
 In 1968 a scandal erupted upon the discovery of a secret plot within the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines to infiltrate saboteurs and instigate destabilization in the 
Malaysian state of Sabah in Borneo. The Philippines supported the Sultan of Sulu’s 
ancestral claim to Sabah. The scandal arose when it was discovered that trainees for the 
operation, who were all Muslim youths, were summarily executed because of disciplinary 
problems. The incident occurred in Corregidor Island. One of the trainees survived and 
political opponents of Marcos brought him forward to tell his story to Congress.76  
 
 No other single event has had such an impact on the security and development of 
the Philippines as the Jabidah incident. The incident convinced many Muslim leaders 
that they could not hope to be treated as equals in Philippine society; hence secession was 
the only option. An influential Muslim politician from Cotabato, Udtog Matalam, 
organized the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), the precursor of the Moro 
National Liberation Front or MNLF. Among the younger leaders of this movement was 
                                                 
75 Ooi Keat Gin, “How Sarawak was won”, The Star, September 10, 2001.  
76 Maritess D. Vitug and Glenda Gloria. Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao. 2000. Ateneo 
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Nur Misuari, an instructor at the University of the Philippines. 77  Misuari would 
eventually emerge as the recognized leader of the Muslim struggle for independence. 
Clandestine preparations were made for armed revolt with the recruitment of Muslim 
youths, their training in Sabah and the accumulation of war materiel. Libya was one of 
the main supporters of the MNLF. Diplomatic relations with Malaysia were all but 
severed by the Jabidah incident and Malaysian authorities turned a blind eye on MNLF 
activities in Sabah.  The state minister of Sabah, Tun Mustapha Harun, actively supported 
the MNLF. 
 
 By early 1973 the MNLF Cotabato Command, the largest MNLF unit, had an 
estimated 6,000 guerillas under arms. According to Fortunato Abat, the MNLF strategy 
called for a quick victory in Mindanao followed by the declaration of a Bangsa Moro 
Republic.78 Evidently, the Moros anticipated diplomatic support from the other Muslim 
countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).  
 
B.  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
 
 The Moro secessionist movement caught the Philippine government in a dilemma. 
Its over-arching goal was to keep the national territory intact. Allowing secession was out 
of question. Mindanao especially was too deeply embedded into the national economy 
and polity that its loss would seriously undermine the existence of the Philippines as a 
viable nation. Mindanao comprised a third of the country’s land area, held 22% of the 
population and provided about 20% of the country’s GDP in 1970. 79  It had vast mineral 
resources whose potential were not yet fully exploited.  
 
 To keep its territory intact the government had to defeat the armed challenge 
without antagonizing Muslim countries and the international community; and it had to do 
                                                 
77 Phil. Army 100 Years 
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this while protecting the Muslim communities whose areas became the battlefield of the 
war.  
 
 Next, it had to assure the Christian majority in Mindanao, which composed more 
then 80% of the island’s population, that their interests would be protected. The 
Mindanao Christians held enormous political and economic power and had exhibited a 
tendency to resort to vigilantism – forming their own armed group to fight against the 
Muslims.   
  
 The Philippine government’s 30-year effort to resolve the secessionist challenge 
in Mindanao has been a mix of successes, missed opportunities, inconsistent policies that 
only recently began to show some measure of success. Its effort was composed of 
diplomatic, military, political and economic initiatives.  
 
  1.  The International Diplomatic Effort 
 
  The purpose of the government’s diplomatic effort was to neutralize 
foreign support for the MNLF. It sought to achieve this by negotiating directly with 
known MNLF supporters like Libya and Saudi Arabia. It established diplomatic relations 
with Middle East countries and invited ambassadors and representatives from the 
influential Organization of the Islamic Council (OIC) and the World Muslim League to 
observe first-hand the situation in Mindanao. The purpose of these tours was to convince 
the Muslim countries that there was no genocide being conducted against the Muslims in 
Mindanao.   
 
  The Government’s diplomatic efforts met with some success. The OIC 
urged the MNLF to opt for autonomy instead of secession. Muslim countries recognized 
and respected the Philippines’ sovereignty and desire for territorial integrity. Negotiations 
sponsored by Libya resulted in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the first substantial 
agreement between the government and the MNLF, which provided for Muslim 
autonomy.   
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  The Agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region 
composed of 13 provinces in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Disagreement immediately 
arose regarding its implementation because the Philippine government invoked 
constitutional process as a prerequisite to any autonomous measures. This required a 
plebiscite, which the MNLF vigorously objected. A plebiscite was subsequently 
conducted in which 10 of the 13 provinces opted for autonomy.  
 
  The MNLF ignored the plebiscite and insisted that autonomy be 
immediately declared for the 13 provinces. Renewed clashes between the AFP and the 
rebels disrupted negotiations. However, these clashes did not have the same intensity as 
those before 1976. Manila also pursued direct negotiations with separate rebel factions 
which were led by the traditional Muslim elite. Incrementally, this piecemeal negotiations 
eroded MNLF strength.   
 
  Another peace agreement was signed between the MNLF and the 
government in 1996 which provides for more substantial autonomy. This agreement had 
to be modified in order to reassure the Mindanao Christians who threatened to arm 
themselves if the agreement granted too much power to the MNLF. This time, the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MILF) which broke off from the MNLF in 1984, declares that 
its aim is independence. Heavy fighting breaks out, this time between the MILF and the 
AFP. 
   
  2.  The Military Campaign 
 
  Like the military effort against the NPA, the campaign to inflict a military 
defeat on the MNLF was a success. Starting from an almost even contest in Central 
Mindanao in 1973, the MNLF was finished as a cohesive military force by 1984.  
 
  The war was long, bloody and expensive. The Philippine Army, which 
carried the burden of fighting, grew in strength from 13,500 in 1970 to 61,000 in 1980 – 
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an increase of 450%. The AFP spent P73 billion from 1970 to 1996 – a major portion of 
the entire defense budget. It is estimated that from 1970 to 1976, 46,000 lives were lost; 
half of these were rebel casualties.80 The rebels suffered from a lack of war materiel and 
by 1980 were limited to a few isolated pockets in Mindanao and on the island of Sulu. 
Muslim communities were most affected by the war. Filipino refugees in Sabah were 
estimated to be more than half a million.81  
   
  By 1985 conditions in Mindanao had improved considerably that the AFP 
moved the bulk of its troops from Sulu to Mindanao in order to face the growing NPA 
threat on the island. During the short-lived ceasefire in 1976-1977, many rebels availed 
of an amnesty program and surrendered to the government. When fighting resumed in 
1978, some rebel leaders chose to work out their own ceasefire arrangement with the 
government, thus the MNLF forces that continued to fight after 1978 were very much 
reduced. Whatever remained of the MNLF had broken up into small, isolated bands. 
Some began to turn to banditry. Commercial activity had begun to pick up in Mindanao 
and Sulu. People and produce could travel safely all over the island. Misuari was in the 
Middle East desperately trying to drum up support for the movement. His efforts were 
not successful and the MNLF was beset by internal squabbling. In 1984 a faction led by 
Hashim Salamat broke away and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 
MILF retained secession as its goal along with the creation of an Islamic state.   
 
  Scholars have generally established two criteria to code a conflict as 
terminated. These must be a dramatic drop in the number of deaths and a formal 
settlement. The second criteria – formal settlement – was unfulfilled in 1985. Because 
there was no formal surrender, the government did not recognize the situation as a victory.  
The Correlates of War, however, code the MNLF war as being over in 1980.82 
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  By 1984 the government had a situation that was equivalent to victory 
over the MNLF but failed to exploit this in the negotiations that followed after the 
overthrow of Marcos in 1986.  
 
  3.  Domestic Political Initiatives 
 
  The government’s political response to the secessionist challenge was 
closely linked to its diplomatic effort. The government offered the rebels autonomy and 
greater participation in the local political process while at the same time assuring the 
Christians of their safety and protection. Many former rebels ran for public office and 
won. However, during the period 1980 to 1986 the MNLF was greatly diminished in 
stature. If any success came from the government’s political effort, it was evident in the 
unraveling of the MNLF and with the break off by the MILF.  The MILF retained the 
goal of secession and added to it the creation of an Islamic, not a secular, state.  
  
  The MNLF continued to demand immediate declaration of autonomy in 
the 13 provinces identified in the Tripoli Agreement but refused to participate in the 
political process in Mindanao. The government maintained that a plebiscite is required 
under the Constitution and created a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) prior to 
the conduct of an autonomy plebiscite. The MNLF and the MIFL bitterly opposed this.  
   
  At any rate, in 1989 the government created the Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with Zacarias Candao as the first governor. Again, the 
MNLF and the MILF refused to participate in the ARMM.  
 
  When Fidel Ramos was elected president in 1992, negotiations are 
resumed with the MNLF and the MILF. As before, both rebel groups are treated as 
military equals in the negotiating table. It appears that Ramos did not want to break the 
pattern set by the previous administration at the risk of appearing hawkish.    
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  4.  The Economic Effort 
 
  Unfortunately for the government, the meaningful implementation of its 
economic programs depended on the success of its political effort. If the situation 
remained unstable, as it did following the return of the MNLF, commercial activity could 
not recover. The MNLF and the MIFL set about establishing so-called check-points along 
the major highways in Mindanao. Many of these rebel installations extorted from the 
traffic on these highways creating friction between government security forces and 
adversely affecting economic activity.  
 
  To achieve Moro cooperation, the government tried to get MNLF leaders 
to lead the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Only in 1996 did Misuari agree to 
be governor of the ARMM. From 1990 to 1999 the autonomous region received P20.7 
billion (approximately $380 million) from the national government, more than half of 
these during Misuari’s term. In terms of per capita allocation by region, the ARMM had 
the second highest in the country.83 However, these funds were not spent judiciously.   
Accounting records showed that there were serious imbalances in ARMM’s expenditures. 
For example, in 1997, 81% went to salaries, 18% to operations and only 1% went 
infrastructure. These shortcomings created friction between Misuari and the central 
government so that by 1998, he was increasingly seen as a liability than as an asset. It did 
not help that Misuari always raised the threat of renewed hostilities whenever he felt he 
was being eased out.  
 
 The region remained depressed. In 2002, six of the ten ARMM provinces are 
among the 10 poorest provinces nationwide.84 
 
 Nevertheless, pursuit of infrastructure projects show some promise if government 
is determined to complete said projects. The case of the Malitubog-Maridagao (Mal-
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Mar )Irrigation Project illustrates this. This was a project that succeeded ins spite of rebel 
activity. It was started in 1989 to irrigate 20,000 hectares of rice land in Central 
Mindanao but was delayed for 18 months because the MILF insisted on occupying the 
construction site as a ‘security force’. Since the MILF was the only other major presence 
in the area aside from government security forces, it was unclear against who or what the 
security was required for.   Many saw it as a form of blackmail: projects could only 
proceed if the Moros took a cut of the funds.     
 
 The project was a P1.7 billion irrigation project started in 1989 to benefit 
inhabitants of an area that was a hotbed of rebellion led by the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF). When fully completed the project will irrigate almost 11,000 hectares of 
rice land, allowing year-round cultivation.86 Originally scheduled to be completed in 
1997, the project was suspended for almost two years when MILF rebels insisted that 
they provide ‘security’ for the project. The Army accused the MILF of extortion and 
fighting erupted between the rebels and government troops. Several Chinese engineers 
were kidnapped and two of them were killed during an attempted rescue. An arrangement 
was worked out that would allow work to continue. The provincial governor declared that 
the project implementers did not sufficiently inform the local inhabitants about the 
project, which led to suspicion and misunderstanding about the intentions of the 
government in the area.  
 
 Finally, in September 2001, the first phase of the project, which would irrigate 
3,800 hectares was inaugurated. Scores of rebels and their families returned to rice-
farming as a result of the project. Several clans feuding over land have settled their 
differences so that they could concentrate on farming. Productivity increased more than 
100%.87  Today, the inhabitants, many of them former rebels, are awaiting the extension 
of the project so that more land can be irrigated for rice farming. 
                                                 
86 http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2001_0927_02.htm 
87 “Donors see Mal-Mar irrigation project a showcase for peace and development”, News and Features, 
Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo), 
http://www.medco.gov.ph/medcoweb/newsfeatl.asp?NewsMode=20&NewsMonthNo=11&NewsYearNo=2
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  5.  Aquino’s Acquiescence 
 
  When Marcos was ousted in 1986, the government of Corazon Aquino 
wanted to make a fresh start on the issue of secession and indicated that it would 
negotiate with the MNLF for a just and lasting peace. As a gesture of good faith, the 
Aquino administration declared a ceasefire and invited Misuari to return from the Middle 
East. The AFP, recognizing that the MNLF had been severely weakened by continuous 
fighting, strongly opposed negotiations and believed that continued military pressure 
would bring better results for the government.88 Their objections, and it doesn’t appear to 
be strong or assertive, were overruled. Misuari returned and immediately set about 
consolidating his fragmented and dormant forces.  He traveled extensively all over 
Mindanao – on government expense - and mounted several “shows of force”. During the 
ceasefire, the MNLF managed to gather and concentrate its dispersed bands and to stage 
impressive displays of numerical strength. The purpose of these displays was to convince 
the government of the MNLF’s strength. The MILF, too, would not be left behind and 
launched a five-day offensive in early 1987 to gain government attention.  
 
  Misuari’s ploy worked. From his resurrection in 1986 until his 
ignominious arrest by Malaysian authorities in late 2001, Misuari had the government 
eating out of his hand. From the outset the MNLF insisted on establishing a political 
entity already rejected by the vast majority of the Mindanao population as early as 1978. 
The MNLF (and the MILF) wanted the government to immediately declare the 13 
provinces identified in the Tripoli Agreement as autonomous (secession for the MILF). 
How the MNLF and the MILF would work out this conflict of purpose is unclear. The 
government countered that it had to consult the populations concerned with a plebiscite. 
The government was confident it could get favorable results against autonomy because 
                                                                                                                                                 
003&NewsFilter=0&NewsPageNo=1&NewsPageSize=10&NewsDetailID=527&PrintThisPage=1: 
assessed 15 November 2003.  
88 Vitug, p. 37. Aquino’s emissary to Misuari was Norberto Gonzales, then chairman of the Partido 
Demokrasya Sosyalista ng Plipinas. When Gonzales told Misuari about the AFP’s skepticism about MNLF 
capabilities, the latter had his commanders in Mindanao show Gonzales around rebel troop concentrations. 
Video images of these displays were shown to the AFP command who were allegedly convinced of 
MNLF’s potency.  
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the majority of the population concerned was Christian who did not wish to be under the 
MNLF.  
 
  When it became known that the government signed an interim agreement 
which granted the MNLF control over most of Mindanao, especially agreeing to the 
creation of a regional security force under Misuari, many Christians vowed to create their 
own security forces. The government set about modifying some of the provisions of the 
agreement.  
  
  The error committed by the Aquino administration in dealing with the 
Moros was a two-step process. First, it decided to negotiate with the rebels. This was not 
in itself a mistake since an agreed termination was preferable to an open-ended rebellion. 
But its second and more serious mistake was to regard the Moros as being at par, 
militarily, with the government. As described above, this simply was not the case.   
 
  At the negotiating table, the MNLF was able to extract from the 
government concessions they could not win on the battlefield. Among these was the 
integration of 7,250 guerillas into the AFP and the national police, the recognition of 
several MNLF camps and the creation of a regional security force under Misuari. It was 
only when the Christians in Mindanao threatened to form their own security forces that 
the government modified the provisions of the peace agreement by watering down the 
regional security force.  
 
  The peace and order situation in 2002 was worse than it was in 1986. 
There are still about 14,000 MNLF guerillas under various degrees of control in 
Mindanao and Sulu. The MILF claims to have 120,000 men under arms. (AFP estimates 
the actual number at closer to 12,000). The Abu Sayaff, non-existent in 1986, has 
replaced the MNLF and the MILF as the main threat to peace and order in Mindanao. It 
claims links with the Al Quaeda and the Jemayaat Islamiyah – both terrorist 
organizations. With assistance from the JI, the rebels had tried to export violence to 
Manila by bombing several mass transit systems and killing 22 people in late 2001.  
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  Had the Aquino administration negotiated from a position of strength and 
confidence in 1986, a position won at great sacrifice by the AFP, it would have better 
used the time and resources it squandered trying to satisfy Misuari during the next 16 
years in rebuilding Mindanao. The government should have dictated the terms of the 
agreement, not bargain with the MNLF, especially along provisions allowing the rebels to 
retain the capability of restarting the rebellion. The option it should have presented to the 
MNLF should have been “take it or fight for it”. Had the MNLF chosen to fight, it would 
have been decisively reduced and peace and reconstruction could have proceeded 
uninterrupted. The MNLF’s true strength was finally revealed in 2001 when its attack on 
government forces failed. This information was already known in 1986; it was ignored. 
 
  The violence that continues in Mindanao is estimated to costs between P8-
11 billion a year.89 At that rate this is equal to P150 billion and sixteen years - that is the 
cost the government paid because it adopted the wrong strategy in negotiating with the 
Moros back in 1986.   
 
C.  THE ROLE OF 3RD PARTIES 
 
 Unlike the NPA, the Moros rely heavily on outside support. It was outside support 
from Libya and Sabah that weighed heavily in favor of launching a rebellion.90 It was 
also outside influence, especially by the Organization of the Islamic Conference that 
prevailed upon the MNLF to modify its goal from secession to autonomy, and to 
negotiate instead of to fight. The sources and influence of this intervention has changed 
over the duration on the conflict.  
 
 From the late 1960’s to about 1974, most of the 3rd party influence especially 
from Libya, the Malaysian state of Sabah and Saudi Arabia was material support for the 
armed rebellion. This changed in 1975 when a diplomatic effort by the Philippine 
                                                 
89 Joshua Dancel, “Mindanao budget shrinking in last 3 years”, The Manila Times, April 3, 2003 . 
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/apr/03/top_stories/20030403top7.html 
90 Vitug and Gloria, p. 22  
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government eventually bore fruit as the Tripoli Agreement. Since then, Muslim nations 
had a moderating influence on the Moros, a stance that continues to today.  
 
 Influence from sub-national groups like the Al Quaeda and the Jemaah Islamiya 
are believed to have begun after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the 1980’s 
some Moro youths went to Afghanistan to fight as mujahideen against the Soviet 
invasion. When they returned they carried with them the fundamentalist zeal and 
international connections that would facilitate the entry of organizations like the Al 
Quaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups sought to transform the secessionist 
movement into a religious movement (jihad) and challenged the leadership of the 
mainstream rebel movements. The effect was a breaking off as radical members saw 
more fulfillment in the approach of groups like the Abu Sayaff.   
 
D.  EXPLAINING THE LAPSE 
 
 Threats from other quarters, especially RAM, the ineptness of the Government’s 
negotiating team and poor advice provided by the AFP offer several explanations why the 
Government ended up negotiating with the MNLF on a basis that did not correctly reflect 
actual tactical situation on the ground.  
 
 The Aquino administration was facing serious threats from the extreme right 
represented by the RAM and chose not to complicate its risks by taking a conciliatory 
position with the MNLF. The AFP was trying to avoid fighting a two-front war against 
MNLF and NPA. 
 
 A second possible explanation is simple incompetence of the Government 
negotiating team. The diplomats who spearheaded negotiations under Marcos were all 
replaced by newcomers to the art of negotiations. Prominent among these were Aquino’s 
brother-in-law, Agapito Aquino, and the former mayor of Cagayan de Oro City, Aquilino 
Pimentel. The MNLF, of course, was always represented by Misuari who, by 1986, was a 
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seasoned veteran of several negotiations since 1975. The Aguino government also did not 
want to appear like its hated predecessor, Marcos, in dealing with the rebels.   
 
 Third, poor advice from the AFP contributed to the failure.  Although initially 
against negotiations, AFP leaders did not stand their ground when confronted with video 
images of staged MNLF demonstrations. It was common knowledge in AFP intelligence 
circles that the MNLF was on a recruiting drive prior to the negotiations. This 
intelligence, already available in 1985, was largely ignored during the time leading up to 
the negotiations.  The AFP did not trust its own intelligence.   
 
 Unlike the NPA, the Moro rebellion is sensitive to 3rd party influence. Of late this 
influence has been positive. Despite a succession of administrations, government 
programs are beginning to be felt in Mindanao. More Muslim political leaders are in 
government and in the civil service; thousands of former guerillas have been absorbed 
into the AFP and the police. Infrastructure like irrigation and roads are improving the 
lives of former rebels.   A long war is not advantageous to the Moros because it is the 




V. THE FUTURE 
 
 Inadequate government response to insurgent challenges, as exemplified in its 
fight-and-develop strategy, the NPA strategy of protracted war and 3rd party intervention 
in the case of the Moro rebellion provides the major explanations for the endurance of  
Philippine insurgencies. The conflicts continue. The influences of these factors are 
presented in the table below:  
 
Table 1. Influences on insurgency in the Philippines. 
 
 Despite the isolation of violence to certain areas and its generally low intensity, 
the Philippines cannot fight and develop at the same time. Violence occurring anywhere 
within a society affects the whole. Resources allocated for maintaining an acceptable 
level of security will deny those very same resources from development. Development 
infrastructure like roads and bridges cannot be built if rebels continue to extort from the 
contractors or sabotage equipment. Classes cannot be conducted if classrooms are used to 
accommodate evacuees from fighting. Efforts to fight and develop will ultimately result 
in both failing. Funds thus misspent and wasted constitute a double loss for society.  It 
would be more efficient to spend adequately first on security, and then only after 
sufficient security has been established should developmental efforts be pursued. 
 
 
A.  EXPLAINING THE DURATION 
 
 The cost of conflict determines its duration and, eventually, its outcome. In 
insurgencies, the cost of remaining in the fight is lower for the weaker actor than for the 








NPA High High Low 
Moros High Low High 
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living conditions for the rebels are little different under conditions of peace or conflict. 
The stronger actor, on the other hand, suffers much more heavily. Much depends on how 
either actor strategically interplays with the other.   
 
 1.  A Flawed Strategy 
 
 The government’s response to both insurgencies exemplified in its unconscious 
fight-and-develop strategy holds the major explanation for their longevity. Its military 
effort lacks weight and decisiveness in defeating the rebel armed groups. Its long-term 
strategy like the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program which would have deflated 
agrarian unrest is inadequate because, as earlier stated, the size of distributable land is 
insufficient for a large and growing number of farmer beneficiaries. At the same time the 
pace of distribution is slow, often delayed by legal obstructions put up by landowners. 
John Sidel provides an interesting explanation of how, despite overwhelming poverty and 
a supposedly democratically elected government, the elite still manage not only to hang 
on to, but to broaden and deepen their their positions in the political power structure.91  
The political system has made it extremely difficult for candidates with little or no 
economic power to be elected. Thus the government, especially the legislative branch, is 
composed mostly of the landholding elite whose political power feeds their own 
economic power in a self-serving cycle. Efforts to attract foreign investment and to 
pump-prime the domestic economy fail because of unfavorable conditions. The dispersal 
of the Government’s resources substantially weakens its impact on the situation.  
                                                 
91 John T.Sidel. “Philippine Politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu. The 
Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 56, No. 4 (Nov. 1997). He writes “…patron-client dyads provide the 
essential social adhesive in Philippine society, crosscutting and undermining potential cleavages based on 
class, corporate or ethnic solidarities through webs of particularistic alliances on bonds of personal 
reciprocity”.  Read Kerkvliet’s explanation for the rise of the Huk rebellion in Central Luzon, in p.29, this 
paper.  
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 2.  Protracted War Strategy  
 
 Commitment to a strategy of protracted war explains the NPA’s willingness to 
ignore what, to the revolutionary mind, would be minor gains achieved by negotiations 
today for a more total revolutionary victory in the future. A small but influential core 
within the CPP/NPA maintains the original aim of overthrowing the present political 
structure through armed struggle. In 2001 the government suspended negotiations with 
the NPA due to the latter’s assassination of elected government officials. Captured 
documents and public declarations made by NPA leaders indicate a ‘talk and fight’ 
strategy pursued by the communists which raises the commitment problem in 
negotiations with the NPA.   
 
 For the Moro rebellion, a protracted war is the next best option to a preferred 
strategy of a quick victory. When its initial offensives were repelled in 1973, the Moros 
settled down to guerilla warfare but always exploited opportunities to establish bases and 
mark out territory – making them vulnerable to AFP operations.  
 
 3.  Intervention by 3rd Parties  
 
 Active support by the state leadership of Sabah and material support from Libya 
and Saudi Arabia made the possible the option of armed rebellion for the Moros. 
However, it was also the influence of 3rd parties, especially Libya and Indonesia, which 
compelled the MNLF to accept autonomy instead of secession.  
 
 The NPA is little influenced by 3rd parties. Its failures to smuggle in arms resulted 
in increasing indifference by China. The revenues it has extracted domestically through 




 4.  Failure to Capitalize on Military Gains  
 
 Military operations had effectively reduced the MNLF as an armed threat by 1984, 
but the political and security situation elsewhere in the country did not allow the 
government to fully exploit this advantage. The Huks were eliminated as an internal 
threat to national security in 1951 yet the basic causes of the rebellion were largely left to 
smolder until it re-ignited in the NPA rebellion of 1969. During the 34 years of this 
continuing conflict the NPA suffered grievously: 22,799 deaths as against 9,867 by 
government security forces. The Moros, likewise, suffered approximately 50,000 
casualties against 30,000 killed on the government side. Since these personnel and 
material losses were not readily replaceable by the rebels, they must have had a heavy 
impact on the rebellions. That the insurgencies continued in spite of these losses indicate 
that direct strategies have limited effectiveness.  The rebels themselves have said that 
unless the basic causes are resolved the rebellions will not end.    
   
 5.  Splintering Rebel Movements  
 
 Break away groups did not recognize any agreement with the Government. 
Additionally, these new rebel groups compensated for their smaller size by committing 
acts of greater violence. For the splinter group, it is more profitable to fight than to settle. 
In such situations, it serves no purpose to negotiate because the main rebel group cannot 
commit to observing the terms of the agreement. 92 
 
 The MNLF had sloughed off the MILF and the latter, the Abu Sayaff. The MILF 
attacked several towns simultaneously in Mindanao in 2000 provoking a severe military 
response from the Government. The Abu Sayaff pillaged the town of Ipil, in Zamboanga 
del Sur in 1995 and kidnapped tourists in Sabah and in Palawan in 1999 and 2000.  
 
 The NPA has splintered into a few mostly localized groups. The 
Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan  (RHB) is a resurrection of the Huks; in Panay island 
                                                 
92 Paul Collier, “Rebellion as quasi-criminal activity”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000, Vol 44.  
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the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RAP-ABB) broke away 
from the NPA. Some of these splinter groups have been encouraged by the AFP while 
others, like the RHB, are opportunistic having decided to extract ‘revolutionary taxes’ on 
their own. The most notorious of these groups was the Red Scorpion Group (RSG) which 
was composed of former NPA urban guerillas that turned to kidnapping.  
 
 There is a major difference in the behavior of break away groups from the NPA 
and the Moros: the NPA itself adheres to violence as its main form of struggle while its 
breakaway groups often reach an agreement with the government. For the Moros, the 
main groups reach agreement with the government while the splinter groups continue to 
commit violent acts.  
 
 6.  Theories of Intrastate Conflict Termination   
 
 R. Harrison Wagner offers the explanation that an extended duration of war, even 
in a stalemate, is a bargaining period where each side tries to convince the other of its 
own inevitable victory and the other’s inevitable defeat.93 And since the stalemate is 
marked by a low level of violence (compared to conventional war), the cost of continuing 
the conflict, i.e., extending its duration, is actually low for both actors.  
  
 The NPA is obviously engaged in a war of attrition with the government, a 
situation described by William Zartman as a ‘hurting stalemate’.94 From 1997 to 2002, 
the NPA incurred 1,248 casualties against 530 for the government. From 1970 to 2002 
about 43,000 lives were lost in the communist-led insurgency, including more than 
10,000 civilians; 22,799 of these were NPA guerillas.95 The bloodiest year was 1985 
when 4,545 deaths were recorded. Economy-wise, the country fell behind its neighbors in 
                                                 
93 R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 
2000) 
94 William I. Zartman. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”. The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1, (September 2001)  
95 Vincent Cabreza. “43,000 killed in 34 years of communist rebellion” in Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 Jan 
2003.  
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economic performance so that by 2002, it was estimated that one in every three Filipinos 
lived below the poverty threshold.  
 
 A mutually hurting stalemate is a precondition to a negotiated settlement. A 
mutually hurting stalemate occurs when the “countervailing power of each side, though 
insufficient to make the other side lose, prevents it from winning”.96 That being the case, 
what keeps them from cutting a deal with the government?  
 
 The NPA is convinced that the existing political system in the Philippines is 
destined by the dialectic process for eventual collapse. As stated earlier, it interprets the 
series of economic and political crises besetting Philippine society as sure signs of this 
eagerly awaited collapse.     
  
 Fearon offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty of ending insurgencies: 
neither party trusts the other to honor any commitments made during negotiations. The 
government, for example, suspects that the rebels will use the peace to recover and 
rebuild their strength; the rebels, likewise, suspect that once they agree to lay down their 
arms, the government will immediately exterminate them. Thus each side retains the 
capability to re-ignite the violence even if a peace agreement has been reached. 
 
 One solution to resolve the commitment problem was the integration of Moro 
rebels into the AFP, which was part of the 1996 agreement. The move worked better than 
anticipated, to the grudging agreement by the AFP.  
 
 The NPA has insisted on a power-sharing arrangement and recognition of 
controlled areas, something that Manila is not prepared to do. 
                                                 
96 Zartman, op cit.  
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B.  RESOLVING THE INSURGENCIES 
  
 The internal conflicts in the Philippines are asymmetric – one side is more than 
twice the other, measured in material terms. The stronger actor is, of course, the 
government. Strategic interaction helps to explain the outcome of symmetric conflict 
better than does simple asymmetry of interest because it is difficult to measure abstract 
concepts like will or interest.  
 
 Actors locked in an asymmetric conflict are faced with two strategic options – a 
direct strategy which targets the enemy’s capability to wage war, or an indirect strategy 
which targets the enemy’s will to fight. A direct strategy will seek to destroy an enemy’s 
weapons, his troops, his communications centers or his logistics. However, actors still re-
generate their capability to fight. An indirect strategy will target an enemy’s home, his 
family, and values. An enemy addressed by such a strategy loses interest in the fight 
since the very reasons for fighting are gone.   
 
 Arreguin-Toft proposed that “when strong actors employ barbarism to attack 
weak actors defending with a guerilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being 
equal, strong actors should win”. 97 
 
 Although the NPA is employing guerilla warfare strategy, the government can 
only employ barbarism at the risk of becoming an outlaw state. Yet, as demonstrated in 
the Mal-Mar project above, there is a method for attacking the enemy’s will without 
“burning the village”. The Philippine government will have to apply a combination of 
short and long-term strategies (also direct and indirect) to defeat the insurgencies. This 
can be called the fight-and-then-develop strategy. It differs from fight-and-develop 
because it requires first the effective elimination of the military threat posed by the 
insurgency before any development project is initiated in the zone of combat. As earlier 
                                                 
97 Arreguin-Toft, p. 109 
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defined, direct strategies focus on the rebels’ capability to wage war; indirect strategies 
focus on their will to fight. Applied in combination and directed at specific areas where 
the insurgencies are widespread, this fight (direct strategy) and then develop (indirect 
strategies) will be more potent than the current fight-and-develop strategy. Moreover, it is 
a deliberate and carefully considered effort rather than one that only falls together in 
hindsight.  
 
 1.  Direct or Short-Term Strategies 
 
 Direct or short term strategies aim to decisively eliminate the military threat posed 
by the armed elements of the NPA and the Moros. Simply put, the overall strategy 
against the insurgency would be to make armed revolt expensive while undercutting its 
fundamental causes. The role of the AFP in reversing this spiral is to contain the violence. 
Only when this is achieved can developmental efforts proceed and recovery take place. 
Peace and stability encourages economic activity. Increased economic activity creates 
growth which has a broad impact on society. Eventually, the contribution of the AFP is 
secondary to that of the political and economic structural adjustments that will address 
the root causes of societal conflict. Whatever can be gained from initial successful 
military operations will be temporary if not followed by fundamental changes.     
 
   (1) Eliminating rebel sanctuaries. Because the Philippines is 
physically separated from any of its neighbors, the rebels are denied the sanctuary where 
they can rest and recuperate immune from government security forces. What exist are 
artificial sanctuaries – areas that have weak government presence, poor infrastructure and 
marginal terrain or where democratic practice protects ‘innocent’ rebel activities. In the 
past, determined government efforts to penetrate these so-called sanctuaries have 
successfully degraded rebel presence but have not totally eliminated them. In the Marag 
Valley, for example, a continued military presence has reduced rebel influence but has 
not materially improved the lives of its inhabitants. The other sanctuary is that offered by 
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cause-oriented groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The causes 
espoused by these groups, like environmental protection and human rights, are valid 
causes. But since these groups are used or allow themselves to be used to shield rebel 
activity, their original causes are compromised.  
 
   (2) Legislative support for counterinsurgency. The Philippines is 
the only nation in Southeast Asia facing not only one but at least two serious internal 
security challenges without an internal security act.98 The lack of legislation which will 
allow robust and effective COIN activity partly explains the propensity of government 
security forces to commit abuses. Admittedly, the country’s experience with martial law 
and the series of military-led uprisings explains the hesitation by the Congress to pass 
such laws. But collaborative relations between the defense establishment and the 
legislature should work towards such legislation.   
 
   In mid-2002 Congress passed the Anti-Money Laundering Law. 
This Law is an off-shoot of the events of 9/11, and was aimed at international financial 
transactions. However it must be enlarged to carry domestic impact. A local version of 
this law should also be enacted to thwart rebel resource generation efforts. These laws are 
unpopular but essential to the defeat of the insurgency. It is the task of the political 
leadership to prepare the population to accept or at least tolerate temporarily these laws.   
 
   Counterinsurgency requires a broad approach and the armed forces 
should limit itself to its area of competence. By trying to go it alone, the AFP has become 
highly politicized. The other agencies of government involved in the delivery of basic 
goods and services must assume their share of the counterinsurgency burden.  
 
   At the local levels, the elected political leaders should provide 
leadership for the counterinsurgency campaign. If the local community leaders do not 
                                                 
98 Indonesia until recently had an internal security act but this was repealed after Suharto was overthrown in 
1998. Malaysia and Singapore have maintained their respective ISA’s although neither face any internal 
security challenge.  
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lead or take active participation in the counterinsurgency campaign, then no military 
activity has any hope of success in that community. 
 
   Barbara Walter argues that neutral enforcers of agreements would 
eliminate a major barrier to a negotiated settlement in internal conflicts.99 In Philippine 
case, international peacekeepers on the ground would be an improvement on the previous 
peace agreements. In 1977 observers were provided by Senegal and Somalia but their 
presence, which was minimal, did not deter fighting from breaking out mainly due to the 
lack of a coercive presence and prestige. A prominent and assertive presence by a 
mutually acceptable 3rd party would enforce a stronger, more stable peace. At the present 
time, both Malaysia and the U. S. have indicated their willingness to provide this 
intervention.     
 
 2.  Indirect or Long-Term Strategies 
 
 Indirect or long-term strategies focus on an opponent’s will to fight. In the 
Philippine case these are a sincere land reform program and fundamental political reform.  
 
  Arguably, no other government program will have such a deflating effect 
on both the communist guerilla movement and the Moro secessionist movement as a 
sincere and determined effort to redistribute the main source of wealth in an agricultural 
society. The challenge posed by economies of scale will have to be worked out, but 
granting land to the tiller, even if land is no longer the source of wealth it once was, is a 
very powerful tool that the Government cannot ignore. Individuals with a stake in society 
are not likely to seek the destruction of that society.  
                                                 
99 Barbara F. Walter. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”. 1997. International Organization 51.  
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  The Philippine political system does not have a real opposition and is 
drawn from a single class of society. Even those elected as a ‘peoples’ candidate with 
humble roots eventually join the elite. Political power, writes Sidel, begets economic 
power.100 This is one reason that the Philippine economy is so sensitive to political 
uncertainties. A genuine opposition will have to be created and the patron-client 
relationship reduced if not totally eliminated so that candidates will be elected on merit, 
not popularity.   
 
 It is not necessary for the Government to seek a formal negotiated settlement to 
end the rebellions. Such a settlement would serve no purpose when faced with an 
obdurate rebellion (NPA) or one where break-away groups continue to threaten and 
commit violence.  What is important is to reduce the level of violence to a point that 
would allow normal economic activity to take place. The Huk rebellion and the Malayan 
Emergency ended without formal agreements101. These were insurgencies that just ‘faded 
away’. The same can apply to both the NPA and the Moro rebellions.  
 
 For an insurgency to ‘fade away’ the cost of armed resistance should be 
sufficiently high to discourage it and there should be palpable, substantial improvements 
in the lives of those who are part of the rebellion.  
             
 Delaying resolution of the communist and Moro rebellions will impose 
increasingly higher and, eventually, insurmountable economic and social costs on 
Filipino society.  In 1970 when the insurgencies were developing, the Philippines was 
less densely populated and was more affluent. With the geographical fragmentation of the 
country’s territory and the fragility of its society, the Philippines can easily transform into 
a failed state, each island or region ruled by its own warlord-elite. Everyone would be 
poorer and society would be totally Hobessian – a war of all against all. 
 
                                                 
100 Op cit.  
101 The Malayan Emergency ended in 1960 but the formal surrender was signed in 1989 – 29 years after the 
actual end of hostilities.   
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C.  FUTURE RESEARCH     
 
 This thesis has not covered in depth the long term options of the Philippine 
government’s response to internal challenges. A more substantial study could focus on 
the effects political reforms. For example, the number of directly elected Muslim political 
leaders from 1960 to the present can be compared to the level of violence associated with 
the Moro rebellion.  For the NPA, the historical levels of tax collection in NPA afflicted 
areas can be gathered to determine the degree of communist influence. Both these threads 
of future research require some primary data gathering.  
 
 For the phenomena of political violence and rebellion in the Philippines as a 
whole, research could focus on the effects of an archipelagic geography – 7,100 islands – 
on the formation of a modern nation-state. Comparisons could be made with Japan (only 
4 major islands and certainly consolidated) and Indonesia (17,000 islands and certainly 
fragmented), the only other archipelagic states.  Geography and social cohesion could be 
another branch to pursue. Geographical fragmentation severely limits the reach and 
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